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The history of the Kingdom of Hawai’i is ultimately remembered solely as the tragic yet
inevitable demise of a native-ruled polity in the face of overwhelming military pressure from
great Western powers. While this may be the popular image, it is important to realize that many
events and scenarios led up to and contributed to the destruction of the kingdom and its eventual
annexation by the United States. Although much focus has historically been on the military
pressures exerted by the United States and the United Kingdom on the so-called “Sandwich
Islands,” these states’ economic and legalistic pressure was also important, especially with
regards to land. Faced with rising government debt and a growing settler population threatening
outright invasion, Hawai’i was forced to implement property laws formalizing foreign norms of
real estate ownership. These laws, aimed mainly for the benefit of the settler population, did not
work with native Hawaiian modes of living, causing widespread native impoverishment and
ecological devastation and concentrating wealth and political power in white populations who
eventually annexed Hawai’i to the United States.
Prior to Captain James Cook’s fateful voyage in 1776, Hawai’i operated on a system of
land ownership not conducive to Western economic means of production, such as plantation
agriculture or forestry. The basic unit of ‘āina, or land, was the ahupua’a, “pie-shaped land areas
running around the ridges of the mountains or the banks of streams down to the ocean.”1 Each
island was divided into these units, which were self-sufficient in all aspects; in fact, trade was
“not a central culture practice.”2 The peasant population, or maka’āinana, meanwhile, was not
formally tied to allocated plots, but rather lived in villages in the ahupua’a and raised chickens
and pigs and farmed taro fields on small informally defined (and often overlapping) plots shared
among extended families. According to historian Jocelyn Linnekin, for much of their diet,
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villages as a whole had “kuleana, right, responsibility… to forage and gather in the common
uplands and forests… and to fish”3 in the ahupua’a’s coastal area. Leaving one’s ahupua’a was
uncommon and discouraged for commoners and the ali’i (chiefs) ruled one or several ahupua’a,
spending time at each one and given these areas of land as responsibilities by the mō’i, or king of
each island, in exchange for tribute. The concept of individual land ownership was foreign to
native Hawai’ian thought, as the ahupua’a were thought of as unchangeable units of a
community as a whole and chiefdom over each unit was seen as more of a customary role than a
proprietary one. This system was relatively stable for around 500 years but could not withstand
the pressure brought on by Western contact.
European arrival quickly destroyed this traditional system of land tenure and social
organization. Beginning with the plagues brought by white voyagers and compounded by the
introduction of alcohol and the musket, the native population of Hawai’i dropped from,
according to one estimate, around 800,0004 in 1776 to just 80,000 by 1850. Widespread
population loss led to many ahupua’a losing their ability to be self-sufficient and subsequent
rural migration to ports frequented by Western sandalwood traders and whalers. These traders
frequently visited ali’i, offering them guns, iron tools and food products in exchange for
sandalwood or cash equivalent. These products’ prices were “grossly inflated”5 by profit-seeking
merchants and many ali’i, either assuming they were gifts or not understanding the concept of
interest, fell into debt, so much so that by 1826, the ali’i of Hawai’i collectively owed $150,000
to American traders.6 This problem was augmented by the fact that, according to historian Ralph
Kuykendall, “as the Hawai’ians did not keep written records… [American merchants] tended to
prejudice their figures.”7 In 1825, the United States, fearful of British and Russian incursions
into the islands and facing a monetary crisis of its own, sent the USS Peacock to Honolulu in
order to force the ali’i to “pay all of the ‘debts’ in full,”8 signing an agreement to that effect
backed with the implicit threat of bombardment. This violation of sovereignty, combined with
increased trader presence and the decline of the native Hawai’ian population, greatly weakened
Hawai’i and led to even more opportunity for foreign influence in the economy, which
eventually ended the islands’ sovereignty.
While much of the Hawai’ian élite believed that these early incursions were isolated
incidents and that traditional Hawai’ian modes of living could continue, increased Western
interference in Hawai’ian affairs continued and it became clear that major reform was needed.
The use of foreign warships to force debt repayment did not stop, as the USS Potomac visited
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Oahu in 1832 for this purpose9 and in 1839, French Captain C. P. T. Laplace “threatened to fire
on Honolulu unless given $20,000”10 in compensation for, among other things, unpaid debts.
Contemporaneously, according to scholar Jon van Dyke, “representatives of overseas nations
began expressing their concern over their subjects’ inability to own property, sometimes
supported by warships.”11 The worst such incident was the Paulet Affair. In 1825, Prime
Minister Kalanimoku awarded British Consul Richard Charlton “a 299-year land grant,”12 the
first of its kind, for him to build a house near Honolulu; in 1840, part of Charlton’s claim was
invalidated by the mō’i, who was both wary of Western concepts of land ownership and who
claimed exclusive authority to grant leases. A British naval convoy, under the command of Lord
George Paulet, responded by annexing Hawai’i and keeping the mō’i under house arrest for five
months. Although the Royal Navy repudiated Paulet and restored the Kingdom’s independence,
this instance shocked Hawai’ian society. After this affair, the Hawai’ian state realized that it
could not continue its traditional mode of existence and had to implement land legislation to
please white populations or risk outright annexation.
After the Paulet Affair, as immigration continued to increase, native Hawai’ian
populations to decrease and ali’i debt to grow, “the pressure on the mō‘i to grant landownership
to protect the capital investments of immigrants likewise multiplied”13 and Hawai’i was forced to
implement land reform. By 1845, the British government publicly floated the idea of military
“interference… to compel a change in… Hawai’ian land policy.”14 Simultaneously hoping to
avoid the fate of New Zealand, fearful of the growing power of the United States and eager to
use a Western style of governance for the benefit of his subjects, the mission-educated
Kamehameha III established in 1846 the Board of Commissioners to Quiet Land Titles, aiming
to establish a land regime for his state.15 The board consisted of two ali’i, a mixed-race trader
and two haole (white) merchants, one of whom, William Little Lee, was one of two lawyers in
the entirety of Hawai’i. 16 After two years of deliberation and negotiations between foreign
consuls, members of the court and the ali’i, in 1848, the Board began what is now termed the
Great Māhele. Under this program, all land in the Kingdom would be surveyed and roughly twothirds chosen by the mō’i, half of which was “added to the government lands,”17 mostly
consisting of economically useless high mountaintops and swamps, while the other half would
become private Crown Lands. The remainder would be given to the ali’i, who had a right to
claim much of their ahupua’a, and the commoners, who could claim small fee simple entails. 18
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The Board’s hope was that by giving lands to the ali’i in perpetuity, chiefs could continue the
ahupua’a system and please Western powers by settling their debts through land leases, while
permanent grants to commoners would, in the words of a contemporary journalist, “rouse the
industry of the people”19 and contribute to internal economic growth to fend off Western
domination. Thus, although such legislation was in essence forced upon Hawai’i, it was hoped
that the process could be done in such a way as to also benefit native Hawai’ians and their way
of life.
However, poor planning, infighting and corruption quickly destroyed this ideal and
resulted in the near-total economic domination of the country by a growing class of haole
planters. The Board itself was corrupt, with William Little Lee actively denying land rights to
natives and after learning that many poorer Hawai’ians could not afford the filing fee to the
Board, “purchas[ing] the[ir] claims” at the same time he was “adjudicating such claims”20 and in
the process becoming one of the richest landowners in the islands. Simultaneously “some [ali’i],
motivated by self-interest … encouraged their commoners”21 to refrain from making claims,
hoping to expand their own. Augmented by “an insufficient number of competent surveyors,”22
the belief of many maka’āinana that their kuleana rights would be protected on others’ fees
simple estates and a lack of advertisement to the commoners, the majority of claims went unfiled
and by the Board’s dissolution in 1855, there was “only one claim for every six maka’āinana.”23
The lack of land rights for the maka’āinana led to many of these farmers moving to cities when
ali’i sold their estates to white debt-holders, losing their traditional rural safety nets and often
falling into poverty as a result. This inadvertent impoverishment and dispossession of the
commoners’ land greatly contributed to Hawai’ian poverty and paved the way for growing haole
economic dominance.
Increased Western pressures for land combined with a series of flawed government and
personal decisions by the mō’i led to a substantial increase in white landownership, causing an
increase in haole power. At the end of the Māhele filing period, the ali’i received a total of
around 2,300 square miles of grants, while commoners collectively received only fifty.24 Given
the evident failure of the Māhele in this regard, the Hawai’ian government passed the Kuleana
Act of 1850, “which granted some gathering and use rights to the maka’āinana”25 on private
lands. Many whites viewed this as a violation of their holdings and American consul Tan Eyck
warned Kamehameha that the Kuleana Act and the few land awards granted to haole “afford[ed]
just cause for the active intervention of foreign governments.”26 However, Western displeasure
with the Hawai’ian land regime soon subsided, as Kamehameha’s new law in 1850 requiring
taxes to be paid in species, in order to raise a balance of trade and maintain Hawai’ian economic
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independence, led many commoners and ali’i to sell their lands and move to cities27 and the
death of Kamehameha in 1854 led to “a significant portion of the King’s land [being] auctioned
off” due to his nearly $31,000 in personal debt.28 Flawed financial decisions by the Hawai’ian
government led to desperate attempts to raise revenue, such that “by 1873, more than 590,000
acres of the Government lands had been sold”29 to haole investors. Missionaries and their
families quickly bought these Māhele land plots being resold and established large plantation
farms of pineapple and, after the collapse of the South’s sugar industry in the wake of the
abolition of slavery, sugarcane. This new oligarchy of planters wrecked ecological and economic
devastation upon the native Hawai’ians and used their wealth and connections to the United
States to increasingly control Hawai’ian institutions for their benefit and eventually end
Hawai’ian independence. In such a way, critically flawed land legislation and government
decisions led to the emergence of a haole élite economically dominating the islands and
eventually annexing them to the United States.
The establishment of a haole planter élite led to substantial ecological changes to
Hawai’i’s landscape that further undermined the ability of native Hawai’ians to continue their
traditional way of life and of the Hawai’ian government to provide for its own people. As
whaling died down and sugarcane plantations became the backbone of Hawai’i’s economy in the
second half of the 19th century, sugar planters of haole, Chinese and Hawai’ian descent required
massive amounts of water to grow the crop. Mō’i Kalākaua, in particular, looked to sugar as an
economic activity in which native Hawai’ians could participate and subsequently sold much of
the Government lands to Hawai’ian planters.30 Kalākaua was also no doubt influenced by the
fact that his tight victory in a special election to the throne was almost entirely due to lobbying
by sugar planters. 31 However, Western planters, backed by steam power and American capital,
vastly outcompeted native owners, who, unable to remain profitable, “sold [their lands] to Haole
capitalists,”32 resulting in much of these lands ending up in American hands. According to
scholar Carol Wilcox, the sugar planters, often based inland and upriver of taro fields,
“transported enormous quantities of water permanently out of the streams” and rivers that fed
native Hawai’ian villages; this, in turn, caused these villages and traditional lands to be
abandoned, as farmers could not get “a sufficient quantity of water”33 to continue traditional
agriculture and sold their lands to these same planters. This led to a near-exponential increase in
the amount of sugar cane, to the point that there were 60,787 acres planted in 1889.34 The
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destruction of native streams also led to the drying of land, a problem compounded by cattle.
Cows, introduced to the islands by Europeans in 1804,35 formed an important part of haole
agriculture and were often left to roam free on upland pastures. The cattle often trampled native
Hawai’ian lands, devastating the maka’āinana, who “would have been unlikely to hire a lawyer”
and get compensation due to the high cost of a lawsuit.36 More devastatingly, however, the cattle,
referred to by ecologist Christopher Lever as “the single most destructive animal in the
islands,”37 killed young trees, which, when combined with water diversion from streams, led to a
noted decrease in rainfall, increased soil erosion and a reduction in the beneficial wind patterns
which enabled much of native Hawai’ian agriculture, leading to “denuded hills”38 in formally
thriving villages and the ecological devastation of much of rural Hawai’i. This devastation
further increased the poverty of native Hawai’ians, as the settler élite continued accumulating
wealth, leading to massive haole political influence and a weakened Hawai’ian government
further unable to defend its own people against foreign influence.
Badly implemented laws and government directives, which provided no limits on cattle
grazing and inadvertently increased the size of holdings by haole sugar planters, led to a
devastating economic situation for native Hawai’ians, compounded by immigration and
increasing haole influence in the government, particularly in education. With traditional lands
essentially agriculturally worthless and an ever-decreasing native population, Hawai’i was left
with a large population of native urban poor workers and little to counter the economic power of
sugar planters, with the white and Portuguese39 population outnumbering natives by 1853.40
Benefiting from their American connections, haole planters grew incredibly wealthy and soon
commanded the Hawai’ian economy, producing the majority of Hawai’i’s exports. Concerned
about the decrease in the size of the native labor pool and with strong influence over mō’i
Kalākaua, whose throne they helped gained, these planters pushed immigration strategies to get
indentured servants for sugar plantations. By 1890, more than 50,000 workers, predominantly
Chinese, Puerto Rican and Japanese,41 had moved to the islands. These workers, with little to no
legal rights, were significantly cheaper than native Hawai’ian labor, leading to a substantial
decrease in the hiring of Hawai’ians on plantations, further stressing the economic situation and
forcing even more natives to sell their plots. Additionally, the decrease in salaried positions for
Hawai’ians diminished the share of native representation in the government, as many Hawai’ians
found themselves under the income line to vote, increasing haole representation and influence in
the Legislature. By 1890, haole, despite being a minority of the population, owned nearly three-
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quarters of all private land42 and comprised half the electorate. With this newfound wealth and
political influence, planters began pushing for more political change to their benefit, changing
the Hawai’ian educational system from primarily mission-run schools to “a system of manual
training and rudimentary literacy conducive to an expanded laboring class that served haole
planter interests”43 intended mainly for native and Asian children. Not only was this
economically useful for plantation owners, but it also caused further marginalization of the
Hawai’ian population, who, with the exception of élites at private schools, were not given the
education and training to pursue careers outside the planter system. By destroying native
agriculture and not allowing native Hawai’ians the education to pursue independent business
opportunities and later employment at the increasingly powerful plantations, the settler élite thus
further marginalized the native population, reducing their power at the same time as massive
immigration reduced the native share of the population and led to a Hawai’ian kingdom almost
completely dominated by settlers.
The political consequences of this increased settler wealth and native Hawai’ian
dispossession ultimately led to the end of Hawai’ian independence and annexation to the United
States. Sugar planters organized in societies such as the Hawaiian Club of Boston and its
successor, the Planters’ Labor & Supply Company (PL&SC).44 These lobbying groups worked in
both the United States and Hawai’i, seeking trade deals with Washington to augment sugar
interests and simultaneously pushing the Hawai’ian government to pass legislation for their
benefit, often with the implicit threat of annexation should their goals not be obtained.45 Pressure
reached a boiling point in 1886 when Kalākaua, having recently been asserting policy more
independent from the planters, sought to increase government spending by applying for a $2
million loan from the British government, to the chagrin of Claus Spreckels, a planter who was
owed $720,000 by the Hawai’ian government and who was worried that this loan would weaken
his political influence.46 Many planters, worried that the loans would mean an increase in taxes,
similarly turned against the mō’i. After a bitter election season with overt calls by native
politicians to Hawai’ian nationalism and a policy of “Hawai’i for Hawai’ians,” in 1887, planters
teamed up with the haole Hawaiian League and its paramilitary arm, the Hawaiian Rifles,
ideologically supported by the PL&SC,47 to force the mō’i, upon the pain of death, to accept a
new constitution, the Bayonet Constitution, in what can be described as a coup. Under this new
state of law, the royal family was reduced dramatically in power and new property requirements
for the legislature “were steep enough that the House of Nobles was primarily selected by and
composed of Westerners.”48 Noticeably, the new constitution placed economic interests at the
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forefront and consisted of an all-white cabinet, which made overtures to the United States for
outright annexation, seeing better sale prices for their sugar crop as an American territory. After
Kalākaua’s death and the ascension of his sister, Lili’uokalani, to the throne, many planters
dismissed her outright as a puppet. Only after the new mō’i “signaled a possible return to the
1864 constitution”49 in 1893 did the Hawaiian Rifles, backed by the U.S. Navy, overthrow the
monarchy and create the strictly white-ruled Republic of Hawai’i, subsequently annexed by the
United States in 1898. An economically and politically empowered haole élite, supported by the
wealth of their large landholdings, thus ended ninety-eight years of Hawai’ian independence.
To claim that a historical event was due to just one cause or person is often to ignore the
complexities and nuances that define history and life. In the case of the Kingdom of Hawai’i,
American military pressure and eventual intervention was not the sole cause of the loss of
independence. Forced to please American and British business interests, the Hawai’ian
government instituted land reform simultaneously intended to aid haole settlers and merchants
and maintain Hawai’ian sovereignty and control over the land. Given the constant threat of
annexation by Western powers and the pressures of the haole lobby, it is not surprising that
Hawai’ian land legislation was critically flawed, transferring vast amounts of land to white
settlers, creating a plantation economy and ultimately leading to the destruction of Hawai’i as it
was. Corruption, bad economic decisions and constant settler pushback created imperfect legal
processes, which led to haole accumulation of land and subsequent economic dominance and the
simultaneous environmental and economic destruction of native, particularly maka’āinana, lands.
These two phenomena led to native Hawai’ian impoverishment, a growing settler influence on
the government and the eventual overthrow of Hawai’i by a landed settler class with economic
interests better suited by annexation to the United States. More than one hundred years after
annexation, Hawai’i remains a settler state, with the military-industrial complex and megacorporations’ tourist enterprises replacing the plantations of yore; whether the status of native
Hawai’ians, currently a subaltern minority in their own islands, will ever change and Hawai’ian
sovereignty will ever be regained is an open question. However, with an increasingly activist
Hawai’ian sovereignty movement, Lili’uokalani’s prayer that e ola e ola ka mō’i, that god smile
upon the islands’ independence, is still the hope for thousands.
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